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THE PEOPLE’S (REPUBLIC) ALGORITHMS
GILAD ABIRI AND XINYU HUANG*
ABSTRACT

Recommendation algorithms, such as those behind social media
feeds and search engine results, are the prism through which we acquire
information in our digital age. Critics ascribe many social and political
woes—such as the prevalence of misinformation and political
division—to the fact that we view our world through the personalized
and atomized prism of recommendation artificial intelligence. The way
the great powers of the internet—the United States, the European
Union, and China—choose to regulate recommendation algorithms will
undoubtedly have a serious impact on our lives and political well-being.
On December 31, 2021, the Cyberspace Administration of China,
a governmental internet watchdog, published a bombshell regulation
directed at recommendation algorithms. These regulations, which came
into effect in March 2022, exponentially increase the control and
autonomy of Chinese netizens over their digital life. At the same time,
the regulation will greatly increase the control the Chinese government
has over these algorithms. In this timely essay, we analyze the content
of the regulation and situate it in its historical and political context.
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INTRODUCTION

Recommendation algorithms, such as those driving the feeds in social media
and news sites and those generating search engine results, are the lens through
which a growing portion of humanity consumes information.1 Many of the
general critiques of the digital public sphere to the effect that it creates political
division and spreads misinformation are aimed at the personalized and atomized
nature of viewing the world through the prism of recommendation artificial
intelligence (AI).2 The way we choose to regulate these algorithms is one of our
generation’s crucial legal challenges.
Until recently, recommendation algorithms, even more so than other types
of AI, were simply not regulated.3 This changed on August 27, 2021, when the
Chinese cybersecurity watchdog released an opinion-seeking draft titled Internet
Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions
(ISAR).4 The official version of ISAR later came out at the beginning of 2022.5
This regulation is first to directly and specifically address the question of
recommendation algorithms. This short essay will describe, contextualize, and
analyze the ISAR. It proposes--good or bad—there is something to be learned
from this regulation regarding the general direction of Chinese cyber-regulation
and the general policy issues raised by recommendation algorithms. To achieve
this goal, this essay places the ISAR within the brief history of Chinese cyberregulation and then critically examines its content through a comparative lens.

1 See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING
WHAT WE READ AND HOW WE THINK (2011) (exploring the ways in which recommendation
algorithms gave rise to the personalized web experience, and the democratic issues arising from that);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, # REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2018)
(describing how recommendation algorithms create division in democratic societies). See also Silvia
Milano et al., Recommender Systems and Their Ethical Challenges, 35 A.I. & SOC'Y 957, 957–967
(2020) (“We interact with recommender [or recommendation] systems [RS] on a regular basis, when
we use digital services and apps, from Amazon to Netflix and news aggregators.”).
2 See e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 235 (“Algorithms are increasingly able to produce accurate
filters, and they’re getting better every day. As with self-selection, so too with algorithms: they make
life easier and more convenient… But here as well, horizons can become narrowed, and people can
get smaller.”); PARISER, supra note 1, at 10 (“They are prediction engines, constantly creating and
refining a theory of who you are and what you’ll do and want next. Together, these engines create a
unique universe of information for each of us—what I’ve come to call a filter bubble—which
fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information.”).
3 Jennifer Cobbe & Jatinder Singh, Regulating Recommending: Motivations, Considerations, and
Principles, SSRN ELECTRONIC J., 31 (2019) ("This means that recommending falls into a significant
and consequential gap in the current legal regime.").
4 Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (互联网信息服务算
法推荐管理规定（征求意见稿）) [Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation
Management Provisions] (promulgated by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Aug. 27, 2021,
draft proposal) (English Translation available at https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translationinternet-information-service-algorithmic-recommendation-management-provisions-opinon-seekingdraft/).
5 Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Suanfa Tuijian Guanli Guiding (互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定)
[Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions] (promulgated
by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
Ministry of Public Security, and State Administration for Market Regulation, Jan. 4, 2022, official
version) (Chinese version available at http://www.cac.gov.cn/2022-01/04/c_1642894606364259.htm)
[Hereinafter ISAR].
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The ISAR is part and parcel of a broader Chinese “tech crackdown” over the
last two years.6 This crackdown has been widely interpreted as a reassertion of
governmental power in the face of the rising tech sector. Specifically, it is part
of China’s complete overhaul of its data security regime.7 Some of the
provisions in the regulation, such as those requiring that algorithms promote
mainstream values and positive energy,8 are specific to China’s tendency to
regulate social morality.9 Many others, such as those aimed at protecting
privacy, battling internet addiction, and increasing user control, address nearly
universal concerns. We show that while many articles reflect or replicate other
Chinese or European legislation, the ISAR breaks new regulatory ground in its
insistence on radical user autonomy and control over recommendation
algorithms: it requires that users be able to opt-out of recommendations and have
meaningful control over how the algorithms profile them.
To foster understanding of how the ISAR seeks to address the challenges of
recommendation algorithms, section I serves as a concise primer on the common
ways these algorithms operate and the nearly universal challenges ascribed to
them. These challenges include issues related to privacy, user autonomy, and
adverse social and political effects.
To truly make sense of the ISAR, one must locate it within the political and
legal context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Section II offers a sketch
of the three periods of Chinese internet regulation: (1) Before 2000: the Chinese
internet was embryonic; regulation focused solely on building up digital
infrastructure; (2) Between 2000 and 2017: the digital industry in China rapidly
expanded; the main regulatory goal remained to encourage the economic growth
of the internet industry, but the government began to also put in place a system
to control online content; and (3) After 2017: China entered an era of assertive,
systemic regulation of the tech industry. Currently, regulators are not motivated
by the need to maintain growth. Instead, they pursue political and social goals
by creating detailed cyber regulations in many fields, including data protection,
privacy, and AI. The ISAR is an emblematic example of the types of regulations
that are currently being promulgated in China.
Following the historical context for the ISAR, Section III will turn to a
detailed analysis of the regulation showing where it parallels other pieces of
legislation and where it breaks new ground and reflecting on whether the
proposed policies can be enforced and the likelihood of their effectiveness. We
6 See generally Angela Huyue Zhang, Agility Over Stability: China’s Great Reversal in Regulating the
Platform Economy, 63 HARV. INT’L. L.J. (2022), (analyzing the many prongs of the crackdown on
big tech); for a useful, concise, guide see, Chang Che, China’s ‘Big Tech crackdown’: A guide,
SUPCHINA (2021), https://supchina.com/2021/08/02/chinas-big-tech-crackdown-a-guide/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2021).
7 See Rogier Creemers, China’s Emerging Data Protection Framework,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3964684#:~:text=Rogier%20Creemers,Leiden%20University%20%2D%20Leiden&text=They%20provide%20a%20new%20approach,close
%20digital%20connections%20to%20China.(last visited Nov. 18, 2021) (analyzing the new legal
architecture of Data Protection in China and arguing that it is meant to mainly regulate the
relationship between consumers and tech companies and mitigate cybercrime).
8 See infra Part III.
9 See e.g., Delia Lin, Morality politics under Xi Jinping, EAST ASIA FORUM (2019),
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/01/morality-politics-under-xi-jinping/ (last visited Nov. 19,
2021) (“In the Xi era, the marriage of law and morality has become an integral part of building the
Chinese socialist rule of law system. This amalgamation is achieved through incorporating a
prescribed moral code, known as socialist core values, in all legal and judicial processes.”).
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conclude by reflecting on the ways in which the ISAR may fit within the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP’s) political project.
I. A PRIMER ON RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHMS

Recommendation algorithms are the prism through which we experience our
digital life. T1hese algorithms affect our choices of the shows and movies we
watch,10 the stories and books we read,11 the news we consume,12 and the
products we buy.13 The personalization offered by these algorithms is an
imperfect but potentially indispensable solution to the challenge of dealing with
the massive deluge of digital information we can easily reach. The goal of
recommendation algorithms largely depends on the business model (or
governance model) of the entity operating them.14 Generally, however, their
input is information about the user’s preference. Their output is a prediction of
what items (news, products, social media content) will keep the user engaged
(or, less cynically, the user prefers).15 Therefore, to be effective,
recommendation algorithms “collect, curate, and act upon vast amounts of
personal data.”16
These algorithms are usually classified into three major categories based on
the type of data they use: (1) Collaborative filtering systems “produce
recommendations to . . . users based on inclinations of other users with similar
tastes.”17 (2) Content-based systems use data on the previous behavior of the
user to extrapolate what they will like.18 (3) Hybrid systems—most
recommendation systems—use both of the aforementioned approaches to create
personalized recommendations for users.19 In that way, they maximize the utility
of their data.
Although it is possible to develop user-centered recommendation
algorithms, virtually all those in existence were developed to promote the growth
of “online commerce and services.”20 It is therefore essential to locate them
within the business models of the companies that use them. As we shall see in
10 See e.g., Carlos A. Gomez-Uribe & Neil Hunt, The Netflix recommender system: Algorithms,
business value, and innovation, 6 ACM TRANSACTIONS MGMT. INFO. SYS. (TMIS) 1–19 (2015)
(analyzing the various algorithms that make up the Netflix recommendations).
11 See e.g., Jieun Shin & Thomas Valente, Algorithms and Health Misinformation: A case study of
vaccine books on amazon, 25 J. HEALTH COMM. 394–401 (2020) (offering an overview of the
Amazon book recommendation system, and a case study of anti vaccination books).
12 See e.g., Natali Helberger, On the Democratic Role of News Recommenders, 7 DIG. JOURNALISM
993–1012 (2019) (offering a framework for the evaluation of the democratic function of news
recommendation AI).
13 See e.g., Brent Smith & Greg Linden, Two Decades of Recommender Systems at Amazon.com, 21
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 12–18 (2017) (discussing the Amazon recommendation algorithm).
14 Milano et al., supra note 1, at 957 (“it is evident that the applications of RS have been driven by online
commerce and services, where the emphasis has tended to be on commercial objectives.”).
15 Id. (“Slightly more formally, they are functions that take information about a user’s preferences (e.g.
about movies) as an input, and output a prediction about the rating that a user would give of the items
under evaluation (e.g., new movies available), and predict how they would rank a set of items
individually or as a bundle.”).
16 Id.
17 Zeynep Batmaz et al., A Review on Deep Learning for Recommender Systems: Challenges and
Remedies, 52 A.I. REV. 4, 1–37 (2019).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Milano et al., supra note 1, at 957.
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our analysis, the ISAR is directed broadly at three types of companies: ecommerce, social media, and gig work.21 In all three, the commercial objectives
of the algorithms are in stark contrast to those of key stakeholders. This gap is
greatest in the case of social media algorithms, which are a key part of social
media campaigns to grab as much of the user’s attention as possible and sell it
to advertisers.22 The algorithm’s goal is to keep our attention for as long as
possible. To this end, social media engages in so-called surveillance capitalism
to gather as much data as possible to feed into the algorithms and maximize the
company’s growth.23 The social and psychological harms of a digital world
curated by algorithms designed to make us addicted have only begun to reveal
themselves.24
A. THREE COMMON CHALLENGES RAISED BY RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHMS
The addictiveness of recommendation algorithms, whether intentional or
unintentional, pose many challenges for modern society. Three major concerns
relevant to the ISAR relate to privacy, user autonomy, and adverse social and
political effects.25
1. Privacy
Scholars identify four stages of privacy risks in the operation of
recommendation algorithms.26 First, personal data is collected without explicit
or meaningful consent.27 Second, the very collection of personal data creates the
possibility of leaks to external entities.28 Third, even if explicit consent was
given, it is impossible for the user (or even the operator) to understand what
inferences recommendation systems can draw. Users might well object to some
inferences if they were aware of them.29 Fourth, even if the system does not have
enough data about a particular user, it is often “able to construct a fairly accurate
profile” by using collaborative filtering.30
2. Manipulation and user autonomy

21 See infra Part III.
22 Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 M ICH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2018) (“The most important
change in the expressive environment can be boiled down to one idea: it is no longer speech itself that
is scarce, but the attention of listeners.”).
23 See e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (1st ed. 2019) (developing the idea of a surveillance
capitalism as a new form of production by which companies collect as much information as possible
on consumers in order to manipulate them).
24 For a helpful review, see Betul Keles et al., A systematic review: the influence of social media on
depression, anxiety and psychological distress in adolescents, 25 INT'L J. ADOLESCENCE & YOUTH 79–
93 (2020) (reviewing the current studies on the high correlation between social media use and mental
illness).
25 Our treatment of this topic is adapted from Milano et al., supra note 1.
26 See generally Arik Friedman et al., Privacy aspects of recommender systems, in RECOMMENDER
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK 649–688 (2015); Ansgar Koene et al., Ethics of Personalized Information
Filtering, 9089 in INTERNET SCI. 123–132 (2015); Dimitris Paraschakis, ALGORITHMIC AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS OF RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS IN E-COMMERCE (2018); Milano et al., supra note 1.
27 Milano et al., supra note 1, at 961.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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The business logic behind recommendation algorithms can lead to attempts
to nudge, manipulate, or addict users to certain types of content or products.31
User autonomy is also limited by the fact that these algorithms classify users into
models that are often self-reproducing. That is, algorithms can limit our options
to those of our social grouping, thereby diminishing our ability to chooseto leave
a group.
3. Negative social effects
Some recommendation algorithms have the potential to transform society.
For example, news and social media filters often “run the risk of insulating users
from exposure to different viewpoints, creating self-reinforcing biases and ‘filter
bubbles’ that are damaging to the normal functioning of public debate, group
deliberation, and democratic institutions more generally.”32 These filter bubbles
often foment disinformation and misinformation online, such as the myriad
campaigns opposing vaccination against COVID-19 during the last two years.33
A related issue is that recommendation algorithms can be hijacked by groups of
active users. This means that news “recommendation systems, streaming
platforms, and social networks can become an arena for targeted political
propaganda.”34 Besides the political risks created by recommendation
algorithms, there are many psychological concerns, especially in relation to
minors on social media.35
Recommendation algorithms have created entirely new challenges for the
world. Responding to these challenges at the legal level is a process that starts
from scratch and goes from crude to perfect. Cyberspace regulation in different
countries and regions is closely related to their political structures and legal
systems and the development of the internet industry.
It is not a coincidence that China has taken the lead in proposing the ISAR
to regulate recommendation algorithms. Since 2008, China has had the most
internet users in the world and a thriving independent digital platform
economy.36 Beyond routine administrative activities, Chinese policymakers also
tend toward “campaign-style governance” in regulation,37 under which existing
institutions and legislation provide administrative resources for quick
31 See id. at 962; Christopher Burr et al., An Analysis of the Interaction Between Intelligent Software
Agents and Human Users, 28 MINDS & MACHINES 735–774 (2018); Katja de Vries, Identity, profiling
algorithms and a world of ambient intelligence, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 71–85 (2010); Koene et al.,
supra note 26; Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi, How AI can be a force for good, 361 SCI. 751–
752 (2018).
32 Milano et al., supra note 1, at 964.
33 On the relationship between social media recommendations are misinformation, see Dominic Spohr,
Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media, 34
BUS. INFO. REV. 150–160 (2017); for an analysis of the particular case of COVID-19 vaccinations, see
Niel F. Johnson et al., The online competition between pro- and anti-vaccination views, 582 NATURE
230–233 (2020).
34 Milano et al., supra note 1, at 964.
35 See Keles et al., supra note 24; Facebook Knows Instagram Is Toxic for Teen Girls, Company
Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 14, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knowsinstagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-company-documents-show-11631620739.
36 Michael Keane & Haiqing Yu, Communication, Culture, and Governance in Asia | A Digital Empire
in the Making: China’s Outbound Digital Platforms, 13 INT'L J. COMM. 4624, 4628 (2019) (discussing
the rise of China's digital platforms as a potential challenge to US-based platforms).
37 See Xueguang Zhou, THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
APPROACH 1-10 (2017) (explaining the campaign-style governance and routine bureaucracy).
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mobilization and harsh enforcement when a perceived crisis looms or a political
goal needs to be accomplished. As a result of this governance style, an
authoritarian political governance structure, and a volatile style of policymaking, cyberspace regulation in China is a pendulum swing from very lax to
very harsh.38 To understand the ISAR in detail, we must first review the brief
history of internet regulation in China.
II. THE REGULATION OF RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHMS IN HISTORICAL
CONTEXT

The history of cyberspace regulation in China can be divided into three
periods.39 First, before 2000, China’s domestic internet economy was relatively
small and economically peripheral and therefore did not receive much regulatory
attention. Second, in 2000, the internet industry entered a period of rapid
development. This period was characterized by a (wary) coexistence between
the relentless growth of internet companies and fragmented regulations. Finally,
after 2017, the passage of a series of laws, such as the Cybersecurity Law, Data
Security Law, Law on the Protection of Personal Information, and Regulation
on the Internet Information Service,40 signaled the advent of an era of more
centralized, systematic, and assertive cyberspace regulation.
A. BEFORE 2000: EMBRYONIC
Before 2000, the internet industry in China was embryonic. Chinese
regulatory strategy focused on encouraging the growth of the internet industry.
Governmental action was mainly limited to establishing the infrastructure, rules,
and institutions necessary to support the nascent industry. For instance, in April
1997, the first National Informatization Work Conference, held in Shenzhen,
defined the main tasks of the national informatization system and adopted the
National Informatization Ninth Five-Year Plan and Vision 2000.41 This plan, the
first to make the development of the internet industry a central policy goal,
recommended the establishment of a nationwide internet infrastructure. The
term “informatization” (xingxihua) refers to the extent to which a geographical
area, an economy, or a society is becoming information based. This term
gradually gained prominence in official documents, while the level of
38 See Zhang, supra note 6 (offering an explanation for the Chinese policy pendulum).
39 See Eric Harwit & Duncan Clark, Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political Control over
Network Infrastructure and Content, 41 ASIAN SURV. 377-408 (2001),
https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.3.377; Anne SY. Cheung, The Business of Governance: China’s
Legislation on Content Regulation in Cyberspace, 338 N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 1-37 (2005)
(providing different views on division of Chinese cyberspace regulation history).
40 ISAR, supra note 5 (Article 1: “In order to safeguard national security and the social and public
interest, standardize internet information service algorithmic recommendation activities, , protect the
lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons, and the other organizations, stimulate the healthy
development of Internet information services, and carry forward the Socialist core value view; and on
the basis of the “Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China”, the “Data Security Law of
the People’s Republic of China”, the “Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic
of China”, the “Internet Information Service Management Rules”, and other such laws and
administrative regulations; these provisions are formulated.”).
41 CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF C HINA, 1997-1999 INTERNET EVENTS,
http://www.cac.gov.cn/2009-04/12/c_126500441.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
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informatization became one of the elements of measuring the level of
modernization.42
As a part of the new strategic goal of internet development, new institutions,
regulations, and annual official reports were established. In March 1998, the
First Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress approved the
establishment of the Ministry of Information Industry. This newly founded
ministry was in charge of the national electronic information products
manufacturing industry, communications industry, and software industry.43 The
internet was not the main focus of the new ministry, but rather one of many
industrial fields it oversaw. At the same time, the China Internet Network
Information Center began publishing annual official reports on internet
development.44 This report describes the state of the Chinese internet industry
and the number of internet users.
In summary, we find that before the twenty-first century, the Chinese
strategy was to encourage the development of the internet industry and the
digital economy. To pursue this goal, the government established institutions, a
basic legal framework, and communication channels. Given the small scale of
the Chinese internet in this period, regulation of cyberspace largely depended on
existing laws and regulations that were not designed with the internet in mind.
B. 2000–2017: THE ERA OF RAPID EXPANSION AND DELEGATED CONTROL
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China’s internet service and
digital economy entered an era of rapid development. In addressing this
explosive development, the Chinese government had two main goals:
maintaining the economic growth fueled by rapid digitalization and at the same
time maintaining its own political rule and legitimacy. The challenge, as Chinese
leaders saw it, was to harness the benefits of the internet for business
development while limiting its potential to disrupt social stability and threaten
state security. However, the sweeping spread of the internet across the world and
its acceptance by nearly all nations persuaded China to abandon absolute direct
control and replace it with various self-censorship schemes.45 This marked the
rise of a new attempt to control the Chinese internet through the delegation to
private internet companies of responsibilities to self-monitor and self-censor.46
These policies developed into what Jack Balkin termed new-school speech
regulations, which are characterized by states forcing (formally or informally)
digital platforms to regulate the speech of users.47
The era of internet-targeted legislation in China began in December 2000
when The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
42 GENERAL OFFICE OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE & GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL,
2006-2020 STATE INFORMATIZATION DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY,
http://www.cia.org.cn/information/syw_1.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
43 CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA, 1997-1999 INTERNET E VENTS, supra note 41.
44 Id.
45 Assafa Endeshaw, Internet Regulation in China: The Never‐ending Cat and Mouse Game, 13 INFO.
& COMM. TECH. L. 41-57 (2004) (explaining the change of regulatory pattern adopted by Chinese
cyberspace regulators).
46 See Anne SY. Cheung, supra note 39, at 4-6 (indicating Chinese regulators increase the self-monitor
and self-censor responsibility to platforms).
47 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2028–29 (2018)
(providing explanations to New School Speech Regulations).
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Congress on Safeguarding Internet Security was published.48 The decision
established a list of cybercrimes, including acts against the safe functioning of
the internet; national security and the stability of society; the socialist market
economy order; societal management order; and personal, property, and other
legal rights of individuals, legal persons, and other groups. This was the first
cyberspace regulation by the National People’s Congress and as such was given
the highest enforcement priority. Subsequently, the State Council released the
Regulation on Internet Information Service of the People’s Republic of China.49
The passing of these two regulatory acts—the starting point of centralized
cyberspace regulation in China—suggests that by this time China’s top
leadership had begun paying close attention to cyberspace regulation.
A good example of Chinese new-school speech regulation during this period
is the increased supervision of internet content providers assumed by the
Chinese administration.50 The declared goal for these regulations was to provide
a “healthy” environment for both political and economic development.51
Representative regulations include the Regulations on the Administration of
Internet News and Information Services jointly issued by the Information Office
of the State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry in 200552 and the
Regulations on the Administration of Internet Audiovisual Program Services
issued by the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television in 2007.53 This
series of security-oriented content regulations and specialized institutions
greatly improved the government’s control over internet content management.
Film and television programs, social media, and internet platforms are all
included in the regulatory scope.54 These regulations were the basis for the
48 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Weihu Hulianwang Anquan De
Jueding (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于维护互联网安全的决定) [Decision of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress on Preserving Computer Network Security]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2009, effective Aug. 27, 2009)
(English Translation available at https://pkulaw.com/en_law/977e6970e7ba2ae9bdfb.html) (last
visited Nov. 14, 2021).
49 Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa (互联网信息服务管理办法) [Measures for the
Administration of Internet Information Services] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 25, 2000,
effective Sept. 25, 2000) (unofficial English Translation by the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-for-the-administration-ofinternet-information-services-cecc) (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
50 Ian Weber & Lu Jia. Internet and Self-Regulation in China: The Cultural Logic of Controlled
Commodification. 29 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 772−789 (2007) (“China’s strategies of overt
control, such as censorship, increased monitoring and limiting access to the internet, are widely
documented.”).
51 Anne S.Y. Cheung & Zhao Yun, An Overview of Internet Regulation in China (University of Hong
Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2013/040, 2013), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2358247 (showing the general goals of
cyberspace regulation in China).
52 Hulianwang Xinwen Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding (互联网新闻信息服务管理规定) [Provisions for
the Administration of Internet News Information Services] (promulgated by St. Council Info. Off. &
Ministry of Info. Indus., Sept. 25, 2005, effective Sept. 25, 2005) (English Translation available at
https://pkulaw.com/en_law/94b5efc6b64db8a8bdfb.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
53 Hulianwang Shiting Jiemu Fuwu Guanli Guiding (互联网视听节目服务管理规定) [Administrative
Provisions on Internet Audio-Visual Program Service] (promulgated by St. Broadcasting, Film & TV
Admin. & Ministry of Info. Indus., Dec. 20, 2007, effective Jan. 31, 2008) (English Translation
available at https://pkulaw.com/en_law/65f73f2f183951d9bdfb.html) (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
54 Rogier Creemers, Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social
Management for the Twenty-first Century, 26 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 85 (2017) (providing a scope on
internet media regulation in China).
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construction of a control and censorship mechanism that included a requirement
of self-censorship and mandatory promotion of official state voices.55
In general, China’s network content regulation in this middle period was
administered by three types of mechanisms: preapproval, process monitoring,
and post-accountability with campaign-based management (represented by
special remedial actions) and agency-based management (represented by
corporate self-regulation).56 Governmental departments set up access
requirements, adopted the real-name system, and conducted reviews of the
progress. They also denounced misconduct in cyberspace. In this regulatory
pattern, platforms were burdened with comparatively more responsibility. When
the responsibility of platforms is increasingly emphasized, regulators often tend
to achieve the transmission of regulatory messages through the interview mode,
transferring the task of public law regulation from the government to the marketoriented internet platforms.57
In contrast with the embryonic stage, the era of rapid expansion saw the
beginnings of the development of a more systemized system of cyberspace
regulation. To supervise the self-monitoring duties of digital platforms, China
established specialized agencies and regulations. In 2014, an institution called
the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was established in Beijing.58
The CAC was given responsibility for regulating internet information services
and cyberspace. Its main focus was promulgating regulations for the preauthorization of digital platforms, and it is responsible for much of the post-2017
wave of cyber regulations, especially those focusing on data protection.
As the number of legal cases involving the internet grew, specializedinternet
courts were established “to construct new litigation rules that meet the needs of
the Internet era.”59 The first special internet court was established in Hangzhou
(where Alibaba’s headquarters are); it was followed by courts in Beijing and
Guangzhou. These three intermediate city courts have centralized jurisdiction
over disputes about e-commerce platforms, copyright, financial loans, internet
contracts, etc., which are brought initially in district courts.60 In the same year,
the Supreme People’s Court released provisions governing the

55 XU WU, CHINESE CYBER NATIONALISM: HOW CHINA’S ONLINE PUBLIC SPHERE AFFECTED ITS
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 1−5 (2005) (providing explanation on how censorship on
internet benefits nationalism movement and the CCP’s official version of patriotism).
56 Li Xiaoyu, Zhongguo Hulianwang Neirong Jianguan Celve Jiegou Yu Yanhua Yanjiu [Study of the
Structure and Evolution of China’s Internet Content Regulation Strategy], 32 INFO. SCI. 24-29 (2014)
(indicating common patterns and development of China’s internet regulation).
57 Li Yonggang, Zhongguo Hulianwang Neirong Jianguan de Bianqian Guiji: Jiyu Zhengce Xuexi
Lilun de Jiandan Kaocha [The Development Process of Internet Governance Policies], 2 J. NANJING
TECH UNIVERSITY (SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION) 44-48 (2007) (analyzing how public sectors
transferred responsibility to platforms).
58 CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA, http://www.cac.gov.cn/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
59 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Plan for Establishing the Beijing Internet Court
and the Guangzhou Internet Court, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=18a935abca63a2d1bdfb&lib=law (last visited Nov. 14, 2021)
(explaining organizational structure of Chinese internet courts).
60 State Structure of the People’s Republic of China, THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF C HINA, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/china_abc/2014/08/23/content_281474982987300.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (“China’s people’s court system is organized into four levels, namely,
there are basic, intermediate, high, and supreme people’s courts, as well as specialized people’s
courts for military, railroad, water transportation, intellectual property,” finance, and internet).
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trial of cases by internet courts.61 Pretrial procedure, trial procedure, evidence
rules, and pronouncements of judgment in internet court are regulated in detail.62
In summary, during this period, the main regulatory goal remained to enable
and encourage the rapid economic growth fueled by the internet industry. This
is probably the reason Chinese regulators (led by the CAC) chose the path of
indirect supervision (allowing companies to self-monitor) rather than direct
control. By creating pre-authorization requirements and post-outcome
accountability, the regulations sought to give companies incentives to fulfill
governmental goals (such as the prevention of “bad social outcomes”) without
direct, costly, administrative supervision. This symbiotic coexistence between
regulators and corporations was disrupted beginning around 2017, leading to a
shift to an era of strong, systematic regulation.
C. AFTER 2017: THE ERA OF STRONG, SYSTEMATIC REGULATION
In recent years, the attention of the Chinese public and leadership has shifted
from a pure focus on the economic benefits of the internet to its many dangers
and challenges. On September 8, 2020, an article in the magazine Renwu titled
Delivery Drivers, Stuck in the System went viral. The article pointed out that the
two Chinese food delivery giants, Meituan and Ele.me, both adopted algorithms
for systematically supervising the performance of employees. It described how
delivery drivers are plagued by multiple problems, such as unreasonable
delivery times, planned routes containing heavy traffic, and heavy fines for late
deliveries.63 The drivers joined the internet economy with hopes for a better life,
but they were left feeling squeezed and oppressed by their AI masters. They are
not the only ones suffering. Digital platforms penetrate the lives of Chinese
people to an unprecedented degree. While these platforms provide desirable
services, their dominance raises many problems, including lack of protection of
privacy, abuse of dominant market position, and infringement of citizens’ basic
rights. As these challenges become more socially salient, they naturally receive
more attention from regulators. In the same year, the fintech giant Ant Group
was asked to cancel its initial public offering at the last minute.64 Jack Ma, the
founder of the tech giant Alibaba Group and the Ant Group, confronted fierce
criticism for making a speech in Shanghai in late October 2020 criticizing

61 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Hulianwang Fayuan Shenli Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Guiding,
Fashi [2018] Shiliu Hao (最高人民法院关于互联网法院审理案件若干问题的规定，法释
[2018]16号) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of
Cases by Internet Courts, Judicial Interpretation No. 16 [2018]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm.
Sup. People’s Ct., Sep. 6, 2018, effective Sep. 7, 2018) Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz., Sep. 6, 2018,
http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/7e594961f195254a863d6cc90be5cd.html (China) (English
Translation available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=a0b15217b5d9c4a9bdfb&lib=law) (last
visited Nov. 14, 2021) (providing details on judicial practice of Chinese internet courts).
62 Id.
63 Lai Youxuan, Waimai Qishou, Kunz ai Xintong li (外卖骑手，困在系统里) [Takeaway Riders,
Stuck in the System], Renwu (人物) [the People], https://epaper.gmw.cn/wzb/html/202009/12/nw.D110000wzb_20200912_1-01.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
64 Katie Canales, Jack Ma hasn’t been seen in public since Ant Group’s IPO was pulled. Here’s how
Chinese regulators slammed the brakes on the firm’s would-be record-breaking $37 billion IPO,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happened-ant-group-ipo-jack- maalipay-2020-11.
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Chinese financial regulation.65 Other tech giants, including Meituan, Didi, and
Tencent, are all under the pressure of antitrust review.66 The unfettered growth
enjoyed by China’s tech giants seems to have come to an end.
In the contemporary era, China’s top leadership is less concerned that the
growth of its big tech companies may be curbed. In fact, due to the big tech
crackdown, the corporations lost trillions of dollars in share value. This extreme
policy shift seems to be part of President Xi’s campaign for the promotion of
“common prosperity,” by which he means a greater redistribution of wealth in
Chinese society. While the first two eras represented a Chinese focus on sheer
economic growth, the current focus is on delivering greater economic equality.67
Since regulators are less concerned about the growth of the industry, they can be
much more assertive with their policies. The laws and regulations passed in this
era are, therefore, much more stringent and systematic.
The new wave of regulations and governmental actions focus on two main
fields: antitrust and personal information protection. In July 2021, the State
Council released a guide for anti-monopoly enforcement in the platform
economy.68 This guidance was part of a massive wave of antitrust investigations
aimed at many (if not most) of the Chinese big-tech corporations.69
Policymakers and academics are increasingly uneasy about the monopoly
position of high-tech companies. These companies often originate in a single
market but use their technology, data, and infrastructure advantages to gradually
develop into cross-market complexes, forming a so-called ecosystem. Recently,
Alibaba Group was hit with a landmark $2.8 billion antitrust fine for abusing its
dominant position over rivals and merchants on its e-commerce platforms.70
Alibaba had pushed certain merchants selling goods on both its platform and
rival platforms to pick only one platform. Similar investigations are aimed at
Tencent, Meituan (food delivery), Didi (ride-hailing), Kanzhun (HR
65 Henry Sender, Jack Ma vs. the Party: Inside the Collapse of the World’s Biggest IPO, NIKKEI ASIA (Nov.
18, 2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Most-read-in-2020/Jack-Ma-vs.-the-Party-Inside- thecollapse-of-the-world-s biggest-IPO.
66 Joanna Tan, China Orders Tencent to Give Up Exclusive Music Licensing Rights as Crackdown
Continues, CNBC (Jul. 24, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/24/china-crackdown-antitrustregulator-orders-tencent-music-to-give-up-music-label-rights.html; Masha Borak, Alibaba, Tencent,
ByteDance and 30 Other Big Tech Firms Sign Voluntary Antitrust “Self-discipline” Pledge at Event,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 15, 2021),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3141245/alibaba-tencent-bytedance-and-30-other-big-techfirms-sign-voluntary (showing Chinese big tech giants confront strong regulation).
67 Sara Hsu, China’s Communist “Common Prosperity” Campaign, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 26, 2021),
https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/chinas-communist-common-prosperity-campaign/ (explaining
“Common Prosperity” and political goal of the CCP).
68 Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Weiyuanhui Guanyu Pingtai Jingji Lingyu De Fanlongduan Zhinan (国务
院反垄断委员会关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南) [Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission
of the State Council for Anti-monopoly in the Field of Platform Economy] (promulgated by the Antimonopoly Commission of the State Council, Feb. 7, 2021, effective Feb. 7, 2021) (English
Translation available at
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=2a4455ec031403a7bdfb&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchC
Keyword=%c6%bd%cc%a8%be%ad%bc%c3%c1%ec%d3%f2) (last visited Nov. 14, 2021).
69 Yuan Yang, How China is targeting Big Tech, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 18, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/baad4a14-efac-4601-8ce4-406d5fd8f2a7 (providing more details on
antitrust investigation on tech giants).
70 Keith Zhai, Alibaba Hit with Record $2.8 Billion Antitrust Fine in China; Penalty Comes Amid
Regulatory Scrutiny on Business Empire of Alibaba Founder Jack Ma, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-hit-with-record-2-8-billion-antitrust-fine-by-chinas-marketregulator-11618018830.
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recruitment), and many more. This antitrust campaign against tech giants
suggests that the Chinese administration is determined to curb big-tech
monopolies and protect the public interest.
Governmental efforts have also focused on the protection of personal
information. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress voted
on August 20, 2021, to adopt the Law on the Protection of Personal Information.
This legislation responds to social concerns and provides a strong legal
guarantee to address the difficult issues of personal information protection. The
law provides both “process protection” and “result protection.” The former
originates from the civil law rights protection approach, with informed-consent
rules at its core, and allows more individual participation in information
processing, such as regarding when and where personal information can be
collected. The latter model comes from public law protection. The state directly
limits the breadth and depth of personal information that can be processed to
prevent over-exploitation so that the value of the individual is protected.71 This
law improves the mechanism of individual rights protection in the digital era and
constructs a new regulatory framework applicable to cyberspace regulation.
In the current era of China’s digital regulations, the government has a zerotolerance policy in relation to any conduct it perceives as threatening the political
security of the regime, and it employs relatively adaptive enforcement strategies
vis-à-vis other misconduct. The space for free public discussion in the digital
sphere has narrowed in recent years.72
III. THE ISAR

The historical context we have just reviewed enables us to better understand
the subject, approach, and style of cyberspace regulation in China. The ISAR was
released in the era of strong regulation, in which exist specified institutions, a
systematized legal framework, and clear enforcement policies. Platforms are
supposed to conduct self-censorship and respond to increasingly detailed
governmental regulations.
In this section, we will analyze the content of the ISAR and contextualize it
within Chinese intellectual and political debates. Many of the problems that the
ISAR tries to resolve—consumer and labor protections, lack of transparency, and
more—have already been addressed in the recent wave of legislation, such as
the Personal Information Protection Law and the Data Security Law. However,
as we discuss below, several of the provisions found in the ISAR are specifically
tailored to address the challenges raised by recommendation algorithms and go
beyond what is found in former legislation.

71 Cai Peiru, Geren Xinxi Baohu Yuanli Zhi Bian: Guocheng Baohu He Jieguo Baohu [Discrimination
of Personal Information Protection Principles: Process Protection and Result Protection], 5 ADMIN.
L. REV. 91-101 (2021) (analyzing two models of private information protection in China).
72 The changes in the field of antitrust practice and personal information protection echo Jack Balkin’s
work. Balkin proposed three models in social media regulation, including the fields of antitrust and
competition law, privacy, and consumer protection law, and balancing intermediary liability with
intermediary immunity. He argues that to shape the organization and incentives of the industry to
better achieve public ends are general goals for regulators. Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and not
Regulate) Social Media, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 71 (2021).
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A. THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHMS
On April 19, 2016, President Xi Jinping hosted a symposium on network
security and informatization and delivered a speech in which he declared his
intention to strengthen Chinese cyber power and further develop the internet
industry. He said that his goal is “to promote the development of China’s
cybersecurity and informatization industry, so that the internet can better benefit
the people.” 73 It is clear that for Xi, the development of the internet industry is
an integral part of the promotion of people’s happiness. For the internet to
promote people’s happiness, President Xi continued, what is needed is a
strengthening of cyberspace regulations.74
Official Chinese voices have been constantly urging stronger and more
comprehensive regulation over algorithmic recommendations.75 Articles in the
official media attest to the government’s determination to regulate the platform
economy generally and algorithmic recommendations specifically. As early as
2018, the official platform, People.cn, published an article entitled How to
Regulate Algorithms in the Era of Internet?76 This article suggested that
algorithmic recommendations meet people’s diversified and personalized
information needs while at the same time forming an “information cocoon” filled
with bad and vulgar content through value-oriented algorithmic
recommendations.77 This is very reminiscent of, and likely influenced by, the
U.S. discussion about echo chambers and filter bubbles.78 At the end of the
article, the author advocated strengthening regulation of algorithmic
recommendations. The ISAR responded to that call. In fact, People.cn published
a comment on the ISAR opining that the platforms should maintain user-oriented
(rather than stockholder-oriented) policies.79
Official media statements echo public opinion to a certain extent.
Regulation of recommendation algorithms gains much support from public
opinion. On Weibo, there is a great deal of criticism of exaggerated
advertisements, eye-catching headlines, extremely emotional articles, and the
like that are provided through algorithmic recommendation. One Weibo user
complains, “The algorithm thing is garbage. A total of 12 recommendations,
eight are what I hate, two are not appealing, only two are my favorite.”80 Some
73 Song Zijie & Li Jiaqi, Xi Jinping “4·19” Jianghua Wu Zhounian: Hulianwang Zaofu Renmin Chuxin
Bubian (习近平”4·19”讲话五周年：互联网造福人民初心不变) [The Fifth Anniversary of Xi
Jinping’s “4-19” Speech: the Internet for the Benefit of the People’s Original Intention Remains
Unchanged], Renmin Wang (人民网) [People.cn] (Apr. 19, 2021),
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0419/c164113-32081898.html.
74 Id.
75 Dai Xin, Chinese politics of the internet: Control and anti-control, 13 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFFS.
181 (2000); William T. Dowell, The Internet, Censorship, and China, 7 GA. J. INT’L AFFS. 111
(2006) (advocating stronger cyberspace regulation).
76 Wangluo Shidai Yinggai Ruhe Guifan Suanfa (网络时代，应该如何规范”算法”) [How to Regulate
Algorithm in the Era of Internet], Renmin Wang (人民网) [People.cn] (Jul. 4, 2018),
https://m.gmw.cn/baijia/2018-07/04/29667875.html.
77 Id.
78 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 at 235; PARISER, supra note 1 at 10.
79 Bao Yuankai, Hulianwang Pingtai Qiemo Hushi Yonghu Daoxiang (互联网平台切莫忽视用户导
向) [Internet Platforms Should not Ignore User Orientation], RENMIN WANG (人民网) [PEOPLE.CN]
(Sep. 2, 2021), http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0902/c1004-32215242.html.
80 From Weibo User “Minjian Xianshan Shuimian Dashi”, Available at
https://weibo.com/u/1023615324?refer_flag=1001030103_&is_all=1(Last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
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netizens summarized the three characteristics of the poor quality of
recommendation AI: difficulty in distinguishing true from false, misleading
results, and superficial profiles.81
The negative side of algorithms is also widely discussed in academia. Zhang
Linghan holds that the abuse of algorithmic power in commercial sectors leads
to unfair trade.82 The use of algorithms in the public sector sometimes challenges
due process and the principle of exclusive power. Also discussed is the potential
negative influence of algorithmic recommendation, especially in the fields of
mainstream ideology, unfair competition, and individual rights protection.83
Scholars also suggest that the platform’s emphasis on data flow reduces the
leading power of mainstream ideology. While user-preference recommendations
intensify concept isolation and value differentiation, filtering recommendations
cause value loss and information manipulation.84 Similarly, scholars are also
concerned that the abuse of algorithms might lead to platform monopoly,
producing risks such as excessive market concentration, competition
solidification blockade, and data security downgrade.85
As for regulating recommendation AI, Ding Xiaodong suggested employing
different regulatory methods for different scenarios.86 He argued that specific
regulatory systems, such as algorithm disclosure, data empowerment, and antialgorithmic discrimination, should be constructed under the principle of
scenario-based algorithm regulation. Wang Qinghua argued that transparency
should be the guiding principle in algorithmic regulation. He believes that
explaining algorithm transparency can relieve the public’s anxiety about the loss
of control over algorithmic decision-making.Other scholars are concerned that
the algorithmic transparency principle is not feasible given the inherent
limitations of ex-post regulation.87 Shen Weiwei argued that the algorithms
transparency principle might undermine national security, individual rights, and
social stability in certain scenarios.88
81 Shanma Zhineng, Youdao Chengi? Liuliang Zhishang? Suanfa Tuijian, Gaobie Yeman Shengzhang
[Induced addiction? Traffic first? Algorithm recommendation bid farewell to savage growth],
WANGYI(Sep. 3, 2021), https://www.163.com/dy/article/GJ0BERBE0538SR0Y.html.
82 Zhang Linghan, Suanfa Quanli de Xingqi, Yihua ji Falv Guizhi [Algorithm Power: Rise, Alienation
and Regulation], 4 STUD. L. & BUS. 63-64 (2019) (“Due to the lack of effective regulation,
algorithmic power in the commercial sphere The lack of effective regulation of algorithmic power in
the commercial sector has created an unfair trade with consumers and given rise to surveillance
capitalism.”) (translation provided by the author).
83 Ding Xiaodong, Lun Suanfa de Falv Guize [On the Legal Regulation of Algorithms], 12 CHINA SOC.
SCI. 138-159 (2020) (“The rise of algorithms poses challenges to their legal regulation as they may
challenge people’s right to have individual freedom and equal protection.”).
84 Hou Dongde & Zhang Liping, Suanfa Tuijian Yishixingtai Fengxian de Falv Guifan [The
Ideological Risk of Algorithm Recommendation and Its Legal Prevention], 321 C HONGQING SOC.
SCI. 77-89 (2021) (analyzing the unneutral nature of recommendation algorithms and its ideological
attributes).
85 Chen Bing & Lin Siyu, “Shuju + Suanfa” Shuanglun Qudong xia Hulianwang Pingtai Shengtaixing
Longduan de Guizhi [On Regulating the Internet Platform Ecological Monopoly Driven Jointly by
Data and Algorithm], 8 INTELL. PROP. 43-63 (2021) (analyzing the negative side of platform
monopoly brought by algorithm).
86 Xiaodong, supra note 83, at 159 (“Algorithms should be regulated in a scenario-based manner, and
different algorithms should be regulated according to different types of scenarios.”).
87 Wang Qinghua, Suanfa Touming de Duochong Weidu he Suanfa Wenze [The Multiple Dimensions of
Algorithmic Transparency and Algorithmic Accountability], 6 J. COMPAR. L. 163-173 (2020)
(“Algorithmic transparency as an information regulation mechanism is an inevitable choice in the trend
of digital socialization and digitization of society, and it helps to dispel public concerns about the loss
of decision-making autonomy in decision-making.”).
88 Shen Weiwei, Suanfa Touming Yuanzhe de Mingsi: Suanfa Guizhi Lilun de Pipan [The Myth of the

31

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. XII:2

We will now turn to a detailed analysis of the ISAR and see how these
concerns affected its drafting.
B. THE ISAR
The ISAR applies to “algorithmic recommendation services”89 that operate
within mainland China. It provides a framework for the regulation of a wide
variety of recommendation algorithms. If implemented, these regulations will
have far-reaching consequences for the Chinese tech industry (as well as for the
select group of foreign platforms allowed to operate in mainland China). The
provisions apply to the “personalized recommendation algorithms”90 that power
social media feed AI—for example, Youku Tudou (the equivalent of YouTube),
Douyin (aka TikTok), Weibo, Twitter, and LinkedIn—content providers
(streaming of music and video), news aggregators, and e-commerce sites.
Furthermore, the ISAR regulates “dispatching and decision-making”91 AI, such
as that used to operate gig-work platforms (delivery and transport services), and
“generative or synthetic-type” algorithms that are used to generate content in
gaming and virtual environments.
One of the goals of the ISAR is to ensure that the user’s online experience,
which is almost always mediated by recommendation AI, does not produce
negative moral and social effects. Some of these negative effects are quite
common sense; for example, Article 18 prohibits the manipulation of minors in
a way that can “encourage internet addiction,”92 “imitate unsafe conduct,”93 or
produce other bad habits. Similarly, there is a requirement that algorithmic
recommendation providers periodically review their algorithms and prevent
them from “leading users to addiction”94 or over-consumption.95 At the same
time, some goals are unique to the PRC’s tendency to regulate social morality.96
For example, Article 6 requires that recommendation algorithms adhere to
“mainstream value orientations”97 and “actively promote positive energy,”98 in
particular when it deals with content presented on “home pages, hot topics, top
recommendations and lists, and pop-up windows.”99 None of these requirements
are especially new or surprising. China has several laws on the books that require
that platforms remove or prevent content that is illegal or contrary to the Party
line. However, these provisions in the ISAR expand the responsibilities assigned
to algorithm operators from preventative measures to the active promotion of
positive content. This promotion seems to mainly consist of content that is:
Algorithm Transparency Principle: A Critique of the Algorithm Regulation], 41 GLOB. L. REV. 20-38
(2019) (“In contrast to essentialism-driven ex ante regulation such as algorithmic transparency, the
pragmatism-driven ex post regulation such as accountability should be a more appropriate regulatory
strategy.”)
89 ISAR, supra note 5.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. (“May not set up algorithmic models that go against public order and good customs, such as by
leading users to addiction or high-value consumption.”).
96 See e.g., Lin, supra note 9.
97 ISAR, supra note 5.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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Patriotic, family-friendly, and focuses on positive stories in
line with the ‘core socialist values’ of the CCP, while
refraining from content that promotes undesirable
behavior—extravagance and over-consumption, violent or
anti-social behavior, sexual promiscuity, excessive adoration
of celebrity idols and other public figures, and political
activism, to name a few.100
Following this logic, algorithms that have the potential to influence public
opinion will be more strictly scrutinized and need to be registered with the
authorities.101
Aside from these paternalist moral requirements, the new regulations list a
wide array of technical and policy requirements. Many of them parallel
provisions in the Personal Information Protection Law, the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation, and the EU AI regulations. Specifically, they require AI
operators to establish systems that will enable different types of reviews of the
algorithm and its various security mechanisms. The ISAR does this by requiring
operators to establish “management systems” and “technical measures” that will
enable the auditing of algorithms, assessments of security, and “personal
information protection” (Article 7).102 Operators are required to regularly
review, evaluate, and verify their AI (Article 8).103 They are also required to
establish a “characteristics database” that will enable them to identify “illegal
and undesirable” information. The spread of illegal information must be stopped
immediately, and the incident must be recorded and reported to the CAC and
related departments (Article 9).104 This stipulation makes the operators liable for
content recommended to users by their algorithms.105 This builds on China’s
Cybersecurity Law, which holds platforms liable for hosting illegal or
undesirable content.106 Compliance with the regulation also requires the filing
of an AI self-assessment report (Article 24).107 None of these requirements seem
to go much beyond what already existed in China’s suite of digital regulations,
and parallels for most of them can be found in EU regulations.
100 Arendse Huld, China Passes Sweeping Recommendation Algorithm Regulations, CHINA BRIEFING
NEWS, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/recommendation-algorithm-regulations-chinacybersecurity-regime/(last updated Jan. 6, 2022).
101 ISAR, supra note 5.
102 Id.
103 Id. (Article 8: “Algorithmic recommendation service providers shall regularly examine, verify,
assess, and check algorithmic mechanisms, models, data, and application outcomes, etc., and may not
set up algorithmic models that go against public order and good customs, such as by leading users to
addiction or high-value consumption.”).
104 Id.
105 Id. (Article 31: “Where an act violating public order management is constituted, public order
management punishment is to be imposed according to the law; where a crime is constituted, criminal
liability is to be prosecuted according to the law.”) (Translation by author).
106 Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), Order No. 53 (China) (Article 47: “Network
operators shall strengthen management of information published by users, and where they discover
information of which the publication or dissemination is prohibited by laws and regulations, they
shall immediately stop dissemination of that information, take measures such as deleting it, prevent
the information from spreading, save relevant records, and report to the relevant departments in
charge.”) (English translation available at http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=22826&lib=law).
107 ISAR, supra note 5.
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The ISAR seeks to address several current controversies, including the
protection of gig workers and issues of differential pricing schemes in ecommerce. Article 20 requires that whenever recommendation AI assigns work
to employees, as occurs with ride-hailing and food-delivery apps, it “fulfills the
obligations of protecting workers’ rights to get reasonable paid, to rest, and to
leave.”108 Article 21 seeks to prevent “unreasonably differentiated treatment” in
pricing and trading conditions online. This especially targets price tailoring
according to the user’s previous purchases, the type of phone they are on, or their
geographic location.109
Where the ISAR breaks new regulatory ground110 is in its insistence on user
autonomy and control over recommendation algorithms. Users must be informed
in a “clear manner” about the “basic principles, purposes, and motives” of the
recommendation services they are receiving (Article 15).111 Other provisions in
the regulation require that users be able to opt-out of recommendation
algorithms altogether (without losing access to the service) and be given the
option to “choose, revise, or delete user tags” used in their recommendation
profile, and finally users are to have the option to demand an explanation from
an operator when they feel AI had “major influence on their rights and interests”
(Article 17).112 The right to opt-out seems to be a plausible solution for some
information recommendation services, such as search engines and e-commerce
sites, where a return to a non-personalized service does not undermine the very
nature of the service. The same is not true of feed-based social media, where the
personal curation of information is inherent in the experience. What is Tiktok
without its personalization algorithm? Not much. This is probably why Article
17 also requires that users be allowed to edit the profiles that inform AI
recommendations. Achieving this will require algorithm operators to design an
interface where users can view their profile and remove or edit the way AI
recommends information to them. This is not as simple as it sounds. Tiktok, for
example, already allows user to download all the information the platforms has
on them.113 Such a download is in the form of an Excel spreadsheet with
thousands of video names, the number of seconds spent on each video, browsing
speed, etc. No regular user can make any sense of such a list, let alone edit it in
a meaningful way. What Article 17 requires, therefore, is for platforms to
develop an interface that can translate the AI profile into a form understandable
to users and then adjust the AI profile in a way that fits the choices made by the
user. This is not a simple task. As we discussed above, recommendation AI
performs “a multi-objective optimization based on a very large number of input
data points.”114 This process is constantly improved by a “continuous feedback

108 Id.
109 Id.
110 The only other piece of legislation or regulation that directly addresses recommender systems is
Article 29 of the EU Digital Services Act, which stops well short of requiring digital platforms to let
users edit their recommendation profiles, and merely requires that they have an option to user the
services without personalization. See European Commission 2020/0361/COD, art. 52, 2020 O.J. (L.
825).
111 ISAR, supra note 5.
112 Id.
113 Requesting Your Data, TIKT OK, https://support.tiktok.com/en/account-and-privacy/personalizedads-and-data/requesting-your-data (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
114 Nikola Milojkovic et al., Multi-Gradient Descent for Multi-Objective Recommender Systems,
AR XIV:2001.00846 [CS, STAT] (2020), http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.00846 (last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
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loop” through which the AI adapts to how well its recommendations worked.115
Recommendation algorithms are, therefore, in constant metamorphosis, which
makes them hard to pin down. This is not to say that achieving meaningful user
control over AI profiles is impossible, but rather that it requires serious
investment by algorithm operators. The same difficulty applies to the need to
explain the recommendations to users.
The content of the ISAR makes clear that Chinese regulators are committed
to addressing the common challenges of privacy, user autonomy, and adverse
political and social effects. The regulators are willing to go far in addressing
these issues and are not concerned about curbing business growth through
overregulation. As we have seen, many of the measures directly parallel those
under discussion in the EU and other democratic legal regimes, while others
make sense only in the context of the PRC.
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHMS IN THE PCR

The technological and business logic behind the operation of
recommendation AI is largely the same across the world, so many of the
challenges facing regulators are generally similar. It is therefore worthwhile for
academics and policy leaders to carefully study the design and future
implementation of the ISAR to learn which measures seem to work and which
do not.
At the same time, as this essay made clear, the ISAR should be understood
as a crucial piece of a much wider political campaign that is endemic to China.
Since the ISAR was recently enacted, it is too early to make any definitive
statements about its exact place in the current political project of the CCP.
To understand the ISAR and Chinese law and politics better, scholars will
need to examine the relationship between recommendation algorithms and the
political legitimacy of the CCP regime. One legitimation strategy that the CCP
seems to be pursuing in its recent “common prosperity” campaign is showing
Chinese citizens that the ruling party is constantly working to improve their
lives.116 That is probably at least part of the reason the ISAR addresses so many
of the issues that the Chinese citizen-body cares about: privacy challenges, the
plight of gig workers, differential pricing schemes, and more.117 This strategy
relies on “accomplishing concrete goals such as economic growth, social
stability, and national unity, to retain its legitimacy.”118 It is possible that
investing in the regulation of recommendation algorithms will yield high
dividends in terms of legitimacy. Since we experience the digital world through
AI algorithms, and since these algorithms are unpopular, regulating them in the
direction of greater user control and autonomy is a good way to show the people
115 Sapni G. K. & Mihir Mahajan, Understanding China’s Draft Algorithm Regulations, DIPLOMAT
(Sept. 16, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/understanding-chinas-draft-algorithm-regulations.
116 See Yuchao Zhu, “Performance Legitimacy” and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy, 16 J.
CHINESE POL. SCI. 123, 123–140 (2011) (analyzing the reasons the CCP chose the path of
performance legitimacy).
117 See Zhang, supra note 6, at 6 (“Indeed, the Chinese government is cultivating mass support by
exerting pressures on Chinese tech firms to lower prices for small merchants, drivers and courier
workers, and to improve welfare for their employees and contractors.”).
118 Zhu, supra note 116, at 124.
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that their lives are meaningfully improved by the government.119 The
centrality of recommendation AI in Chinese information consumption
cannot be overstated. Regulating it in a way that increases user privacy and
autonomy, which is a central part of the ISAR, may be seen as a good way
of reminding the citizens of the positive impact on their lives of
governmental power. In a way, recommendation AI and the centrality of
digital devices in our lives open up a new venue for the pursuit of
performance legitimacy. If the recommendation algorithm regulations are
effectively enforced, citizens will see a dramatic change in the way they are
able to navigate their digital life.

119 See Zhang, supra note 6, at 146 (“A lingering question for the great reversal in regulating
Chinesetech giants is whether it will ultimately benefit the hundreds of millions of Chinese
consumers, small merchants, delivery workers and ride-hailing drivers who are connected by
these behemoth online platforms, as well as the employees and contractors of those
platforms.”).

